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Fighting for the Right to Housing in Canada
TRACY HEFFERNAN, FAY FARADAY & PETER ROSENTHAL∗
“Lawyers going it alone is nonsensical.”
Justice Zakeria Yacoob,
Former Justice of the Constitutional Court of South
Africa1
Cet article se penche sur la décision Tanudjaja c Procureur général qui porte sur le
« droit au logement ». Les auteurs, tous trois avocats ayant été impliqués dans l’affaire,
traitent du contexte de celle-ci, de la nature de la demande et des questions juridiques
relatives aux réclamations fondées sur les articles 7 et 15 de la Charte canadienne des
droits et libertés. Ces questions comprennent les obligations positives en vertu de la
Charte et du droit international, les procédures innovatrices adoptant une approche
systémique et remettant en question des lois opprimantes, et les ordonnances de
surveillance innovantes. Les auteurs examinent les implications procédurales et de fond,
de la démarche des gouvernements provinciaux et fédéraux de faire une requête en
radiation. Ils étudient les décisions de la Cour supérieure de justice de l’Ontario et de la
Cour d’appel de l’Ontario de radier la demande. Ils analysent l’impact de ces décisions
pour les plaideurs futures en matière de Charte. Ils traitent également de la relation entre
l’organisation communautaire et le droit d’ester en justice des communautés
marginalisées.
This paper examines Tanudjaja v Attorney General—the “Right to Housing” case. The
authors, co-counsel on the case, discuss the context of the case, the nature of the
application, and the legal underpinnings of the section 7 and 15 Canadian Charter of
Rights and Freedoms claims, including positive obligations under the Charter and
international law, innovative procedure taking a systemic approach to challenging
oppressive legislation, and innovative supervisory orders. The authors examine the
procedural and substantive implications of the provincial and federal governments’ move
to strike the case, parse the Ontario Superior Court of Justice and Ontario Court of
Appeal decisions striking the application, and analyze the impact these decisions may
have for future Charter litigants. They also address the relationship between community
organizing and litigating rights of marginalized communities.

∗

Tracy Heffernan is a community activist and lawyer at the Advocacy Centre for Tenants Ontario. Fay Faraday is a
Toronto lawyer with an independent social justice practice focused on constitutional, human rights, and labour
law. She is also a Visiting Professor at Osgoode Hall Law School, the Packer Visiting Chair in Social Justice at
York University, and an Innovation Fellow at the Metcalf Foundation. Peter Rosenthal is Professor Emeritus of
Mathematics and Adjunct Professor of Law at the University of Toronto. His legal practice is primarily devoted to
cases concerning social justice.
1

Zakeria Yacoob, former justice of the Constitutional Court of South Africa, in a talk at the Wellesley Institute,
Toronto, Canada, 15 February 2013.
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I. OVERVIEW
ADEQUATE HOUSING IS FUNDAMENTAL to ensuring physical and mental health, social
inclusion, and participation in society. It safeguards the capacity to exercise and experience other
fundamental rights. It is necessary for human life and essential to survival.
So how is it that across Canada we have at minimum 235,000 people who are homeless
and close to one in five who experience extreme housing affordability problems?2 A crisis in
homelessness and affordable housing does not “just happen.” It is not a “normal” or “inevitable”
part of modern society. Instead, the systemic mass homelessness that currently exists in Canada
is a very recent phenomenon that emerged in the mid-1990s as a direct result of government
funding cuts.3 It is a manufactured social problem that is the entirely predictable outcome of a
series of active legislative and policy choices made by the federal and provincial governments.4
Homelessness and inadequate housing continue to be produced and sustained by that interlocking
system of laws and policies.
Frustrated with the lack of action to rectify this social crisis, a group of individuals with
lived experience of homelessness, community activists, academics, and lawyers in Ontario
launched an innovative legal challenge in 2010. The Tanudjaja v Attorney General of Canada
and Attorney General of Ontario challenge asserts that in taking the active decisions to
implement these laws and policies that produce and perpetuate homelessness and inadequate
housing, the federal and provincial governments have violated the constitutional rights of the
most marginalized members of our communities.5
The authors are co-counsel representing the applicants in the Right to Housing challenge.
This paper provides an in-depth analysis of the legal foundations for that claim. It analyzes the
foundations for recognizing that the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms imposes positive
obligations on government to safeguard social and economic rights that are fundamental to
human survival such as the right to housing. It provides an analysis of how Canada’s
international human rights obligations to protect social and economic rights like the right to
adequate housing inform government obligations under section 7 and section 15 of the Charter.
The Right to Housing challenge presents an innovative approach to Charter litigation. It
deliberately defines the nature of constitutional obligations and the scope of Charter rights from
the perspective of those who are most marginalized. It also directly challenges the systemic roots
of marginalization, aiming to hold government accountable for building an identifiable network
of interconnected laws and policies that predictably facilitate and exacerbate oppression and
2

Stephen Gaetz, Tanya Gulliver & Tim Richter, The State of Homelessness in Canada: 2014 (Toronto: The
Homeless Hub Press, 2014), online: <http://www.homelesshub.ca/SOHC2014> [Gaetz, Gulliver & Richter, State of
Homelessness: 2014]. See Michael Shapcott’s “Precarious Housing Iceberg” chart at p 9 of his affidavit, Tanudjaja
v Attorney General of Canada and Attorney General of Ontario (2011), ON SC File No. CV-10-403688,
online: <http://www.acto.ca/en/cases/right-to-housing/application-material.html > [Shapcott, “Affidavit”].
3
Gaetz, Gulliver & Richter, State of Homelessness: 2014, supra note 2 at 4–5.
4
As Jack Layton wrote, “Homelessness is not some mysterious affliction visited upon us by unseen forces. It is the
tragic, but inevitable, outcome of a series of policy decisions. And just as homelessness can be created, so too can it
be ended.” Jack Layton, Homelessness: How to End the National Crisis (Revised and Updated) (Penguin Books:
2008) at xxv [Layton, Homelessness].
5
Tanudjaja et al v Attorney General of Canada and Attorney General of Ontario (2012), ON SC File No. CV-10403688.
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marginalization. The systemic nature of the Right to Housing legal claim is both novel and
central to its essence. It takes on what in the environmental context has been called the “slow
violence” perpetrated by existing systems and institutions.6 As Rob Nixon writes,
[w]e are accustomed to conceiving violence as immediate and explosive, erupting
into instant, concentrated visibility. But we need to revisit our assumptions and
consider the relative invisibility of slow violence. I mean a violence that is neither
spectacular nor instantaneous but instead incremental … Emphasizing the temporal
dispersion of slow violence can change the way we perceive and respond to a variety
of social crises … .7
The national crisis of homelessness has not erupted instantaneously as in the wake of a
natural disaster. It is instead a socially constructed disaster that continues to accumulate
inexorably. As Cathy Crowe has written, “[a] disaster is not just a single event but a social
consequence.”8 What this means is that looking at a single law or policy change in isolation fails
to reveal the depth of the impact on the rights claimants. Examining discrete state actions in
isolation fragments the inherently interconnected consequences experienced by those who are
homeless or at risk of homelessness and renders the unconstitutional effect of the state-driven
system either invisible or only partially revealed. The claim is novel in that it consciously maps
the system and the interrelated systemic effects. In this way, the Right to Housing challenge
examines the breadth of state action that is necessary to sustain particular power relationships
and presents a direct challenge to how we conceive of government accountability for the
consequences of its policy choices.
The governments’ response was to launch motions to strike the Charter claim in its
entirety on the basis that it was not justiciable and that it raised no reasonable cause of action
under either section 7 or section 15. The governments argued that the claim was not justiciable
because it raised “political” rather than legal concerns and that the remedies sought (which
included declarations of rights violations, injunctive relief and supervisory orders) were beyond
the institutional competence of the court. The governments argued that neither section 7 nor
section 15 of the Charter imposed any positive obligations on government, nor did they protect
social and economic rights.
The Ontario Superior Court of Justice allowed the motions, striking the claim in its
entirety without leave to amend. The motion judge ruled that the claim raised non-justiciable
political questions, sought non-justiciable remedies, and raised no reasonable cause of action
under either section 7 or section 15.9 On appeal, the Ontario Court of Appeal issued a divided
ruling.10 The majority dismissed the claim on the basis that it raised non-justiciable political
questions.11 In view of this analysis, the majority did not examine the scope of protection that

6

See Rob Nixon, Slow Violence and the Environmentalism of the Poor (Cambridge: Harvard University Press,
2011).
7
Rob Nixon, Slow Violence: Literary and Postcolonial Studies Have Ignored the Environmentalism that
Often Only the Poor Can See, online: The Chronicle of Higher Education (26 June 2011)
<http://chronicle.com/article/Slow-Violence/127968/>.
8
Cited in Layton, Homelessness, supra note 4 at “Foreword” xiii.
9
Tanudjaja v Attorney General (Canada) (Application), 2013 ONSC 5410, Lederer J [Tanudjaja 2013].
10
Tanudjaja v Canada (Attorney General), 2014 ONCA 852 [Tanudjaja ONCA].
11
Ibid at para 19, Pardu JA.
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may be afforded under either section 7 or section 15.12 In a strong dissent, Feldman JA would
have allowed the appeal and allowed the claim to proceed on its merits because “the application
raises significant issues of public importance.”13 Feldman JA ruled that the application raised
justiciable legal claims, sought justiciable remedies, and that there was support in the
jurisprudence for both the section 7 and section 15 claims. Characterizing the claim as a “serious
Charter application” that raised issues that are basic to the life and well-being of a large,
marginalized, vulnerable, and disadvantaged group, Feldman JA concluded that it was an error of
law to strike the claim at the pleadings stage and that the evidentiary record supporting the claim
should be put before the court.14 At the time of writing, the claimants are seeking leave to appeal
to the Supreme Court of Canada.
Regardless of the outcome of the litigation on the motion to strike, the legal analysis
supporting the claim warrants closer examination because it presents innovative strategies and
analysis on both procedural and substantive elements of Charter litigation that can contribute to
future thinking on how to ensure that Charter rights remain responsive and accessible to those
who are most marginalized.

II. FORMULATING THE CASE
Across Canada at least 235,000 people are homeless annually and close to one in five experience
extreme housing affordability problems.15 This has a significant impact on individuals, families,
and communities: it takes a serious toll on physical and mental health, reduces life expectancy,
and exacerbates mental health problems.16 In 2013 alone, the public expenditure on emergency
responses to homelessness (emergency shelters, health services, social services, and correctional
services) cost $7.05 billion.17 According to some research, providing adequate housing for all,
including supports where needed, would cost about half this amount.18
In the face of this, the question looms: how do we address this growing crisis of
homelessness? Can the right to housing be realized in Canada? In 2008, four activists19 posed
these questions at a workshop. Scheduled early on a Saturday morning, it was packed to capacity
12

Ibid at para 37, Pardu JA.
Ibid at para 43, Feldman JA, dissenting.
14
Ibid at paras 43, 64, 68, 81, 86–88. Feldman JA dissenting.
15
Gaetz, Gulliver & Richter, State of Homelessness: 2014, supra note 2 at 5; see e.g. Shapcott, “Affidavit,” supra
note 2 at 9.
16
Mental Health Commission of Canada, Paula Goering et al, National Final Report: Cross-Site At Home/Chez Soi
Project (Calgary, AB: 2014) at 9 [Goering, National Final Report].
17
Stephen Gaetz, et al, The State of Homelessness in Canada 2013 (Toronto: Canadian Homelessness Research
Network Press, 2013), online: <http://www.homelesshub.ca/sites/default/files/SOHC2103.pdf > .
18
See e.g. Stephen Gaetz, “The real cost of homelessness: Can we save money by doing the right thing?” (Toronto:
Canadian
Homelessness
Research
Network
Press,
2012)
at
2,
online:
<http://homelesshub.ca/ResourceFiles/costofhomelessness_paper21092012.pdf >. As Gaetz points out, it would cost
far less to do the right thing, that is, to provide adequate housing [Gaetz, “Real Cost of Homelessness”]. See also
Goering, National Finding Report, supra note 16 at 9. The researchers found that for every $10 spent on providing
adequate housing and supports, the government saved $15; for similar findings in Alberta, see The Alberta
Secretariat, “A Plan for Alberta: Ending Homelessness in 10 Years” (October 2008),
online: <http://www.housing.alberta.ca/documents/PlanForAB_Secretariat_final.pdf >.
19
John Fraser, Centre for Equality Rights in Accommodation; Jennifer Ramsay, Advocacy Centre for Tenants
Ontario; Peter Rosenthal, Barrister, Roach, Schwartz; Tracy Heffernan, Kensington-Bellwoods Community Legal
Services.
13
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with people with lived experience of homelessness, community activists, students, and lawyers.
That meeting marked the beginning of a lively conversation. It also marked an evolution in deep,
long-term community organizing. And it has fed an evolution in public discourse to understand
housing not only as a necessity for human survival, but to see the systemic erosion of housing
security as a violation of fundamental human rights.
Soon after the initial workshop in 2008, the Advocacy Centre for Tenants Ontario
(ACTO)20 launched the inaugural Right to Housing (R2H) Coalition meeting, which pulled
together a wide range of individuals and groups with a deep concern for housing security.21 For a
full year the Coalition discussed, debated, and argued about whether we should launch a legal
challenge to assert the right to adequate housing in Canada. When four extraordinary individuals
and one organization stepped forward as applicants, the Coalition decided to proceed with a
constitutional challenge.
It is critical that, from the outset, the Right to Housing challenge has been built from the
ground up through collaborative efforts by a broad coalition of individuals and community
organizations. In keeping with Justice Yacoob’s admonition, this has never been a case of
“lawyers going it alone.”22 This collaborative process has been accountable and responsive to the
goals of those with lived experience, who were clear from the beginning that they were not
seeking monetary damages. Instead, they want real, meaningful, systemic change that will build
a future where housing security can be realized for all.
There is a long-standing debate politically and academically about the capacity of
litigation to advance social transformation for those who are marginalized.23 That concern about
the utility of litigation was seriously considered in the lead up to the Charter challenge. Is the
dialectic between rights and politics too unpredictable and vulnerable to co-optation to help those
who are marginalized? Can those who are marginalized expect their realities to be understood
and protected by those in power to whom those realities are alien or threatening to their own
established privilege? Does framing a claim as a rights claim disempower a social movement by
placing undue reliance on the courts to rectify social power imbalances? At the same time,
however, this debate recognizes that rights skepticism is, in large measure, a luxury that is only
truly available for those who already enjoy an experience of rights. Opting out of rights discourse
is something that marginalized communities do at their peril. As Patricia Williams has written,

20

The Advocacy Centre for Tenants Ontario is a provincial legal clinic focusing on housing and human rights
funded by Legal Aid Ontario.
21
A few of the founding organizations included the Dream Team (psychiatric survivors advocating for supportive
housing), Holland Bloorview Kids Rehabilitation Hospital, the Centre for Equality Rights in Accommodation,
Sistering (a drop-in for homeless women), the June Callwood Centre for Young Women, the Social Rights
Advocacy Centre, the Toronto Disaster Relief Committee, and the Children’s Aid Society (Toronto). For a complete
list of all the individuals and organizations that have supported or been involved with the right to housing coalition,
see: <http://www.acto.ca/en/cases/right-to-housing/list-of-organizations-and-individuals-who-have-participated-inandor-endorsed-the-right-to-housing.html>.
22
Yacoob, supra note 1.
23
See, e.g. Judy Fudge, “What Do We Mean by Law and Social Transformation?” (1990) 5 Cdn J Law & Society
47; E M Schnieder, “The Dialectic of Rights and Politics: Perspectives from the Women’s Movement” (1986) 61
NYUL Rev 589; Gwen Brodsky and Shelagh Day, Canadian Charter Equality Rights for Women: One Step
Forward or Two Steps Back? (Ottawa: Canadian Advisory Council on the Status of Women, 1989); Allan
Hutchinson, “Charter Litigation and Social Change: Legal Battles and Society Wars”, in Charter Litigation, R.J.
Sharpe, ed (Toronto: Butterworths, 1987); Alan Hunt, “Rights and Social Movements: Counter-Hegemonic
Strategies” (1990) 17:3 Journal of Law and Society 309.
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“[Rights elevate] … one’s status from human body to social being”24 because through the
articulation of rights, a group’s experiences acquire public value, are understood as entitlements
of social citizenship, and demand a remedy. Ultimately, while it involves risks, litigation is a
valid and at times necessary field of engagement both as a process of movement building and as
a defence of core entitlements because,
[l]aw is an enormously powerful discourse, both ideologically and practically. It
distributes social power and structures the ways in which we understand and value
experiences by granting public legitimacy to particular ways of interacting. Legal
rights are normative; they identify the boundaries of acceptable social interaction,
shape an individual’s [and a community’s] sense of self, and impose a social
responsibility to achieve in practice the ideals that are articulated in formal laws.
Legal rights thus have intrinsic value because, once articulated as formal principles,
they change the way society identifies injuries and recognizes an entitlement to
restitution.25
In this context of recognizing the benefits and risks of rights claims, it is important for
our Coalition that litigation has been just one strategy of many. While recognizing the role of
litigation in shifting entrenched discourses, the Right to Housing Coalition has engaged in an
extensive process of community organizing, mobilization, and alliance building.26 We have
participated in demonstrations to call for affordable housing with groups across the country. We
have been involved in postcard campaigns to encourage the federal government to recognize
housing as a human right. We have lobbied both the federal and provincial governments,
including lobbying on two federal bills that would have required the adoption of a national
housing strategy.27 We have provided workshops to students and community organizations
across Canada and begun the process of building a national coalition. We have never forgotten
that there “ … is no option, really, to old-fashioned, back-breaking political mobilization.”28 The
litigation and its outcome are neither the only nor the dominant narratives. They are one part of a
larger reality of community engagement, used to strengthen and empower the community but
always backed up by “…marches, media, legal education and social mobilization.”29
While the litigation is just one piece of the fight for the right to housing, the legal issues it
raises are important and warrant examination in their own right for the ways in which they push
the boundaries of our thinking about constitutional rights and obligations. To that end, this article
24
Patricia J Williams, “Alchemical Notes: Reconstructing Ideals from Deconstructed Rights” (1987) 22 Harv CRCL L Rev 401 at 416.
25
Fay Faraday, “Dealing with Sexual Harassment in the Workplace: The Promise and Limitations of Human Rights
Discourse” (1994) 32:1 Osgoode Hall LJ 33 at 36, see also 35–40.
26
The issue of community mobilizing is addressed in more detail in Yutaka Dirks’ contribution to this collection:
“Community Campaigns for the Right to Housing: Lessons from the R2H Coalition of Ontario.”
27
Bill C-304, An Act to ensure secure, adequate, accessible and affordable housing for Canadians was a private
member’s bill introduced in 2010 at the time of a Conservative minority government. The bill garnered the support
of the Liberals, New Democrats and Bloc Quebecois members of Parliament. It would have passed but for the
proroguing of government in March 2011; see Parliament of Canada (Private Member’s Bill – C-304, second
reading (40-3)). The now Conservative majority government voted against the Bill and it was defeated at 2nd
reading: see also Parliament of Canada (Private Member’s Bill – C-400, (41-1).
28
Arundhati Roy, Public Power in the Age of Empire (New York: Seven Stories Press 2004) at 40.
29
Mark Heywood, “South Africa’s Treatment Action Campaign: Combining Law and Social Mobilization to
Realize the Right to Health” (2009) 1:1 J Human Rights Practice 14–36 at 22 [Heywood, “South Africa”].
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proceeds as follows. Part III provides an overview of the launch of the litigation, the nature and
context of the litigation, and a brief history of what has transpired over the last five years. Parts
IV and V examine the legal arguments advanced in the case with respect to sections 7 and 15 of
the Charter grounded in a broader poverty law analysis. Part VI touches on the issue of legal
remedies. Part VII concludes with some thoughts about the nature of socio-economic rights and
returns to the notion of community organizing.

III. THE RIGHT TO HOUSING CHALLENGE
A. FIVE APPLICANTS STEP FORWARD
When four extraordinary individuals and one small but mighty community organization stepped
forward as applicants, the Right to Housing Coalition decided to proceed with the litigation. The
evidence in the application describes their situations as follows.
Ansar Mahmood suffered a catastrophic industrial accident that left him unable to work.
He has four children: one child, Rohail, has severe cerebral palsy and must use a wheelchair;
another is autistic. The family of six lives in a two bedroom non-accessible apartment. They are
on the waiting list for an affordable accessible home. It could take twelve years before they are
housed. By that time, Rohail, who currently must be carried from room to room as the hallways
are too narrow for his wheelchair, will be twenty years old. Mr. Mahmood writes,
[t]he apartment is extremely crowded. There is not even room for a dresser to store
our clothes. Nor is it accessible for a person in wheelchair. The bathtub is too small
for Rohail’s bath chair. Rohail should be sleeping in a hospital bed with sides but,
again, we do not have sufficient space. The apartment is too small and too crowded
to manoeuvre his wheelchair around. Mostly we have to leave him on his bed in his
room.30
For several years Janice Arsenault experienced the bliss of having a home and
community. She writes, “[i]t was the best time of my life. I had safe, secure, affordable housing.
My children were loved and well cared for. I had a husband who loved me. I had a husband I
loved.”31
But when her husband died suddenly after routine surgery, Janice and her two young sons
found themselves homeless. Taken in by friends and neighbours, she and her children couch
surfed for ten months until their welcome ran out and they were forced to move to a shelter.
Shelters for the homeless are mostly horrific places in Canada: there is violence, bedbugs, and
theft.32 Many lose all their belongings within a short period of time.33 Heartbroken, Janice sent
her children to live with her parents 2,000 kilometres away; she ended up on the streets. Janice is
currently housed but her rent consumes 64 per cent of her modest income, placing her at high
risk of homelessness.
30

Affidavit of Ansar Mahmood, sworn 13 May 2010, paras 16–17, on file with the authors.
Affidavit of Janice Arsenault, sworn 12 May 2010. para 11, on file with the authors.
32
See for instance, Erika Khandor & Kate Mason, Street Health Report 2007, Toronto: September 2007 at 14–15,
online: <http://www.streethealth.ca/downloads/the-street-health-report-2007.pdf>.
33
Despite the appalling conditions it costs on average $2000 per month for a bed in a homeless shelter; see Gaetz,
“Real Cost of Homelessness,” supra note 18 at 5.
31
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Jennifer Tanudjaja is a young single mother who was apprehended from her family at the
age of twelve. She is a straight “A” college student with high hopes for her future and that of her
children. She spends her entire social assistance cheque on rent for a two-bedroom apartment in
Toronto and tries to subsist on a child tax benefit to feed herself and her children, buy clothes,
and pay for transportation and other costs. She lives in fear of homelessness. She writes,
[i]f I had access to a housing subsidy, I wouldn’t have to worry all the time about
how I was going to pay the rent, or afford a metro pass, or pay for my school books. I
wouldn’t have to wonder about whether I have the transit fare to take my boys to a
doctor’s appointment. I wouldn’t have to worry about the cost of fruit and vegetables
and whether I can afford to feed my sons healthy food. I wouldn’t be constantly
anxious about ending up in a homeless shelter with my boys.34
Brian DuBourdieu lives on the streets of Toronto. He lost his job when he was diagnosed
with cancer and became severely depressed. Without a pay cheque he could no longer pay his
rent. He lost his home and has been on the waiting list for affordable housing for four years. He
writes,
[l]iving in affordable housing would allow me to completely change my life. The
stability housing would give me would relieve the constant stress I feel from being
homeless. The ability to control my own diet would improve my health and I would
feel secure knowing my medications would not be stolen. I am convinced that if I
were able to find housing I would be able to get help for my mental health and
addiction problems and would eventually be able to get a stable job and contribute to
society again. I would love to have a place to hang my hat.35
The fifth applicant was the Centre for Equality Rights in Accommodation (CERA), an
Ontario-based non-profit organization that tackles housing and human rights issues by working
with low-income tenants and people who are homeless, providing advice, direct services, and
public education. CERA is a membership-based organization and many of its members have
themselves experienced homelessness. The precarious and unsettled lives of individuals who are
homeless and inadequately housed present an enormous barrier to engaging in protracted
litigation and enforcing rights. It is in itself a concrete example of how homelessness erodes the
capacity to experience and assert fundamental entitlements in society. In this context, the
presence of a public interest applicant was critical in supporting the sustainability of what was
anticipated to be lengthy litigation.36

34

Affidavit of Jennifer Tanudjaja, sworn 17 May 2010, para 38, on file with the authors, [Tanudjaja, “Affidavit”].
Affidavit of Brian DuBourdieu, sworn 4 October 2010, para 25, on file with the authors.
36
The importance of public interest applicants in supporting litigation by marginalized populations has been well
recognized by the courts. See, e.g. Canada (Attorney General) v Downtown Eastside Sex Workers United Against
Violence Society, 2012 SCC 45, [2012] 2 SCR 524; Fraser v Canada (Attorney General), 2005 CanLII 47783 (ON
SC).
35
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B. CONTEXT AND THE NATURE OF THE LEGAL CLAIM
Under our Constitution’s division of powers, both the federal and provincial governments have
jurisdiction to make laws and policies relating to housing. For decades, both levels of
government have been actively engaged in designing, implementing, and delivering programs
integrally related to ensuring access to adequate housing. While the federal government
historically “played the major role in shaping how Canada’s housing stock was financed and
allocated, and the degree to which critical social needs for adequate housing were met,”
provincial and municipal governments “also played important roles in the shaping and
administering of housing and social programs, often supplementing or cost sharing federal
programs.”37
Canada’s active and central role in relation to affordable housing began as early as 1935
with the adoption of the Dominion Housing Act. It was furthered in 1946 with the establishment
of the Central Mortgage and Housing Corporation (now the Canada Mortgage and Housing
Corporation). Since then, Canada has had an active role in supporting access to affordable
housing through programs such as:
(a)
(b)
(c)
(d)

direct funding for the construction of affordable rental housing units;
government administration of affordable rental housing through a wide variety of
public housing, non-profit housing, co-operative, and rent supplement rental units;
programs of affordable housing funded through cost-sharing arrangements with
the provinces; and
the provision of rent supplements to tenants in private rental units.

From the end of the Second World War until the late 1970s, the Canadian housing system
was explicitly directed to ensuring that residents of Canada were securely housed in adequate
housing. This perspective was encapsulated in a 1973 speech in the House of Commons by the
Honourable Ron Basford, then federal Minister of State for Urban Affairs (a federal ministry that
no longer exists). In introducing amendments to the National Housing Act, Minister Basford
clearly stated that our society–and our government–has an obligation to see that all people are
adequately housed:
…good housing at reasonable cost is a social right of every citizen of this country. …
[T]his must be our objective, our obligation, and our goal. The legislation which I am
proposing to the House today is an expression of the government’s policy, part of a
broad plan, to try to make this right and this objective a reality.38
Over the next two decades the federal government funded more than 600,000
affordable homes across Canada.39

37

See J. David Hulchanski, Affidavit, Tanudjaja. v Attorney General of Canada and Attorney General of Ontario
(2011), ON SC File No. CV-10-403688, at para 29; see online: <http://www.acto.ca/en/cases/right-tohousing/application-material.html > .
38
House of Commons Debates, 29th Parl, 1st Sess, (15 March 1973) at 2257 (Honourable Ron Basford).
39
See Shapcott, “Affidavit,” supra note 2 at para 19.
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In pursuing protections against homelessness and inadequate housing, federal and
provincial laws and government policies have been built upon three important and
interconnected components:
(a)
(b)
(c)

access to affordable housing;
income support to ensure the affordability of housing; and
physically accessible housing and housing with supports for community living for
persons with disabilities.

Since the mid-1990s, each of those three pillars of housing security has been undermined
and dismantled through active choices made by the federal and provincial governments. As is set
out in detail in the sections that follow, both levels of governments have enacted or amended
laws and instituted changes to policies, programs, and services which have resulted in mass
homelessness and inadequate housing.40

C. ERODING ACCESS TO AFFORDABLE HOUSING
Beginning in the mid-1990s and continuing to the present, the federal government has taken a
number of decisions which have eroded access to affordable housing including: (i) cancelling
funding for the construction of new social housing; (ii) withdrawing from the administration of
affordable rental housing; and (iii) phasing out funding for affordable housing projects under
cost-sharing agreements with the provinces. At the same time, the Ontario government has taken
its own decisions that erode access to affordable housing, including: (i) terminating the
provincial program for constructing new social housing; (ii) amending legislation to eliminate
protection against converting affordable rental housing to non-rental uses and eliminating rent
regulation; (iii) downloading the cost and administration of existing social housing to
municipalities and responsibility for funding development of new social housing to
municipalities which lack the tax base to support such programs; and (iv) heightening insecurity
of tenancy by creating administrative procedures that facilitate evictions.41
As of December 2013, there were 165,069 households in Ontario on the waiting list for
affordable housing.42 The waiting list has increased every year since 2006 and “For every
household housed … three more apply.”43 On average it takes almost four years for a household
on the waiting list to receive affordable housing, but in some communities—and particularly for
families—the waiting time can be considerably longer, even exceeding ten years.44

D. ERODING ACCESS TO INCOME SUPPORTS FOR AFFORDABLE
HOUSING
At the same time that policies were being implemented that eroded access to affordable housing,
the federal and provincial governments amended legislation and altered policies in various
40

Ibid at para 17.
Ibid at para 12-19 and 29–44.
42
Waiting Lists Survey 2014, (Ontario: ONPHA’s Report on Waiting List Statistics for Ontario, 2014) at 4 [Waiting
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Ibid at 5.
44
Ibid at 6.
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income support programs. These changes increasingly undermined the ability of low income
tenants to pay their rent.
Until 1996, federal transfer payments for social assistance under the Canada Assistance
Plan (CAP) were conditional on the provinces providing social assistance at a level that would
cover the cost of basic necessities, including housing.45 In 1996, the federal transfer payments
were restructured by repealing this legislated standard. Under the Canada Health and Social
Transfer, which replaced CAP, federal transfer payments are no longer tied to these substantive
thresholds. At the same time, Canada implemented changes to the Employment Insurance Act,
which resulted in far fewer unemployed workers qualifying for benefits upon losing their jobs,
with the result that more unemployed workers must rely on social assistance instead.46
In October 1995, the Ontario government cut social assistance rates by 21.6%, one of the
most dramatic social assistance decreases across the country. Since that time, Ontario has
maintained the social assistance shelter allowances at levels that are far below what is required to
secure rental housing on the private market. When the provincial government eliminated most
rent controls in 1998, rents increased dramatically and evictions for arrears of rent escalated. In
2012-13, 75,069 eviction applications were filed at the Landlord and Tenant Board; of these 80%
were for arrears.47
A typical example illustrates the impact of these cumulative federal and provincial
legislative changes. In 1994, under Ontario Works, a single mother with two children received a
maximum monthly shelter allowance of $707; the average rent for a two-bedroom apartment in
Toronto was $784, leaving a shortfall of $77. In 2012, the maximum shelter allowance was $641;
the average rent for a two-bedroom apartment was $1,183, leaving a shortfall of $542 per
month.48 This entirely predictable gap results in many social assistance recipients becoming
homeless or being forced to forgo other necessities—such as food—in order to maintain their
housing.49

E. LACK OF ACCESSIBLE HOUSING AND HOUSING SUPPORTS FOR
PERSONS WITH DISABILITIES
Finally, the federal and provincial governments have implemented a range of policy changes that
leave persons with disabilities particularly vulnerable to homelessness.
45

See Shapcott, “Affidavit,” supra note 2 at 14.
See Falling Behind: Ontario’s Backslide into Widening Inequality, Growing Poverty and Cuts to Social Program,
A Report of the Ontario Common Front (Ontario: A Report of the Ontario Common Front, 2012) [“Falling
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2013)
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online:
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Existing affordable housing stock is often physically inaccessible to persons with
disabilities.50 Meanwhile, sufficient new accessible affordable housing is not being built. As a
result, it is not uncommon for people with disabilities to wait ten years or longer to get off the
waiting lists and into affordable housing that can accommodate their needs.
Moreover, government policies of deinstitutionalizing persons with psycho-social and
intellectual disabilities in the absence of providing effective mechanisms to support their
independent community living has resulted in widespread homelessness among persons with
these disabilities. In addition, persons with psycho-social and intellectual disabilities are often
discharged from medical care without appropriate attention to whether they have access to
adequate housing with appropriate supports.51
There has been international critique of these policies. The United Nations (UN) human
rights treaty monitoring bodies, for instance, have expressed concern at Canadian governments’
failure to provide adequate supports for community living for persons with mental disabilities,
noting that in some instances this has resulted in these individuals being forced to live in
detention solely because of a lack of community-based housing with supports.52

F. INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS OBLIGATIONS
All of these deliberate actions by the two governments—actions to amend legislation and to
amend or withdraw policies and programs that had previously protected rights to adequate
housing—were made in a context in which Canada has numerous explicit commitments in
international human rights instruments to safeguard and promote the right to adequate housing.
In particular, these international human rights instruments with respect to economic, social, and
cultural rights expressly commit Canada “to take measures to the maximum of its available
resources … with a view to achieve progressively the full realization of these rights,” including
the right to adequate housing.53 The actions by the two governments then appeared to run in
direct contradiction to these commitments. This squarely raised the question that has been skirted
in Charter litigation to date, about whether and to what extent social and economic rights are
justiciable under the Charter.54 To what extent does the Charter protect social and economic
50
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No. 16 at 49, UN Doc A/6316 (1966), 993 UNTS. 3, entered into force 3 January 1976, Article 2 [ICESCR].
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Legal Activism, (Vancouver: UBC Press, 2007); Sandra Rodgers & Sheila McIntyre (eds), The Supreme Court of
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rights? To what extent must section 7 and section 15 be interpreted in light of Canada’s
international human rights commitments?
Canada has ratified a range of international human rights instruments that expressly
recognize housing as a basic human right. The Universal Declaration of Human Rights, adopted
in 1948, states,
[e]veryone has the right to a standard of living adequate for the health and wellbeing
of himself [or herself] and of his [or her] family, including food, clothing, housing
and medical care and necessary social services … 55
In 1951, the UN General Assembly drafted two covenants to implement the Universal
Declaration: the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) and the
International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR).56 The right to
housing is defined most clearly in Article 11(1) of the latter which commits signatory states to
“take appropriate steps to ensure the realization” of “the right of everyone to an adequate
standard of living for himself [or herself] and his [or her] family, including adequate food,
clothing and housing … ”.
Unfortunately the division into two covenants was not merely symbolic. The ICCPR
established an international supervision mechanism with the United Nations system and imposed
on states an immediate duty of implementation. In contrast, the mechanisms created under the
ICESCR were less developed and imposed only a duty that states take steps “… with a view to
achieving progressively the full realization of these rights” to the maximum of their “available
resources”.57
These international covenants laid the foundation for the Canadian Charter of Rights and
Freedoms. However, the privileging of civil and political over socio-economic rights has seeped
into several Charter decisions, particularly at the lower court levels. This has gone neither
unnoticed nor unchallenged. While querying the timidity of both lawyers and litigants in
advancing socio-economic claims, former Supreme Court of Canada Justice Louise Arbour
stated:
The approach of Canada’s courts has not escaped the notice of the United Nations
Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights. In 1998, when reviewing
Canada’s compliance with its international obligations, the Committee stated that it
had received information about a number of cases in which claims were brought by
people living in poverty, alleging that government policies denied the claimants and
their children adequate food, clothing and housing. The Committee noted that
provincial governments “have urged upon their courts … an interpretation of the
55
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A/810 (1948) (art. 25); Canada has subsequently guaranteed the right to adequate housing through the following
covenants: Convention on the Rights of the Child; Convention on the Elimination of all Forms of Discrimination;
Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities.
56
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, GA Res 2200A (XXI), 21 UN GAOR Supp No 16 at 52, UN
Doc A/6316 91966), 999 U.N.T.S.171 entered into force 23 March 1976, hereinafter ICCPR; and ICESCR, supra
note 53.
57
Daphne Barak-Erez & Aeyal M. Gross, “Introduction: Do We Need Social Rights? Questions in the Era of
Globalisation, Privatisation, and the Diminished Welfare State” in Daphne Barak-Erez & Aeyal M. Gross, eds,
Exploring Social Rights: Between Theory and Practice (Oxford and Portland, Oregon: Hart Publishing, 2007) at 4.

Published by Osgoode Digital Commons, 2015

22

Journal of Law and Social Policy, Vol. 24 [2015], Art. 2

Charter which would deny any protection of Covenant rights and consequently leave
the complainants without the basic necessities of life and without any legal remedy.”
It is important to stress that the Committee is not stating that governments have an
obligation to directly provide all things to all peoples. What it has pointed out,
however, is that courts in Canada have “routinely opted for an interpretation of the
Charter which excludes protection of the right to an adequate standard of living and
other Covenant rights.”58
This litigation, then, responds to Justice Arbour’s call to take social and economic rights
seriously and to ensure that Charter rights are meaningful for those most in need of the Charter’s
protection.

G. ESSENCE OF THE LEGAL CLAIM
The Right to Housing challenge argues that the rights to life, security of the person, and equality
must be interpreted in light of Canada’s international human rights obligations to provide
meaningful protection under section 7 and section 15 for those who are homeless or at risk of
homelessness.
The essence of the Right to Housing legal claim is that the federal and provincial
governments have taken deliberate actions to amend laws, policies and programs in the areas of:
(a) affordable housing; (b) income supports to ensure affordability of housing; and (c) physically
accessible housing for persons with disabilities and housing with supports for community living
for persons with disabilities. They have done so in a way that predictably creates and sustains
increasingly widespread homelessness and inadequate housing. In adopting and implementing
these legal and policy changes, Canada and Ontario have taken no measures or taken inadequate
measures to address the impact of these changes on groups most at risk of homelessness. They
have failed to undertake appropriate strategic coordination to ensure that government programs
effectively protect those who are homeless or most at risk of homelessness. As a result, they have
created conditions that lead to, support, and sustain homelessness and inadequate housing and
have produced severe health consequences and death among the most marginalized groups in
society contrary to section 7 and section 15 of the Charter.
A number of UN bodies responsible for monitoring Canada’s compliance with
international human rights commitments have repeatedly raised grave concerns about the effects
of homelessness and inadequate housing on vulnerable groups and the failure to take positive
measures to address these issues. The UN Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights,
as well as the UN Special Rapporteur on Adequate Housing, have repeatedly recommended that
Canada adopt a national strategy to ensure that the right to adequate housing is implemented on
an urgent basis to address this “national emergency.” They recommend that this strategy be
developed in collaboration with provincial and territorial governments.59 Despite these concerns
and recommendations, Canada and Ontario have failed to implement a coordinated strategy to
58
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reduce homelessness. Shocking, but true: Canada is the only major country in the world without
a national housing plan.60 And despite the fact that Canada has repeatedly represented in the
international forum that the guarantee of security of the person under section 7 of the Charter
ensures that persons are not to be deprived of the basic necessities of life, and that the Charter is
the primary source of legal protection for the rights found in the ICESCR, including the right to
adequate housing.61 As set out below, the governments’ responses to the Right to Housing claim
were to move to strike the application in its entirety on the basis that the rights claimed did not
exist under the Charter and were non-justiciable.

H. THE LEGAL PROCESS
In May 2010 the applicants issued a Notice of Application under Rule 14 of the Rules of Civil
Procedure62 advising the Attorney General of Canada and the Attorney General of Ontario that
they would bring an application for violation of the Charter and international law.63
After issuing the Notice of Application, the applicants began the long, arduous work of
amassing the evidentiary record. Twelve expert witnesses gave freely of their time to draft expert
witness affidavits, including: Miloon Kothari, the former UN Special Rapporteur on Housing;
Catherine Frazee, the former Ontario Human Rights Commissioner; Charles Taiowisakarere Hill,
Executive Director of the National Aboriginal Housing Association; and Dr. Stephen Hwang, a
renowned doctor at St. Michael’s Hospital who has conducted research on the correlation
between inadequate housing and homelessness, serious illness, and mortality.
The 10,000 page evidentiary record was served on the Attorneys General of Ontario and
Canada in November 2011. In response, the Attorneys General requested that they be granted a
commensurate amount of time to create a responding record. Instead, six months later, on the
second anniversary of the issued Notice, the Attorneys General advised they would bring
motions to strike the application in its entirety without a hearing on the evidence.

I. THE GOVERNMENTS’ MOTIONS TO STRIKE THE LEGAL CLAIM
A motion to strike64 is intended to strike out a legal proceeding where it discloses no “reasonable
cause of action” and it is “plain and obvious” that there is “no chance of success.”65 Such
60
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motions are generally used to strike out statements of claim. Their purpose is much murkier
when it comes to striking out complex Charter applications.66
It is also an awkward procedural tool in this instance. Whereas a statement of claim
details all the material facts pertaining to a claim and can be used to paint a complete picture of
the litigation, the same is not true of a notice of application. A notice of application does not set
out the material facts, but only the more general legal grounds for the claim. On an application,
the facts are established in the affidavits that form the evidentiary record. In the Right to Housing
challenge, the 10,000 pages of affidavit evidence are the bedrock of the application; the breadth
and depth of the record demonstrates that these are not issues to be argued in the abstract. Yet the
Rules of Civil Procedure expressly provide that no evidence can be before the court on a motion
to strike.67
Despite the inappropriateness of using motions to strike in Charter cases, increasingly it
would appear that this is the Attorneys’ General tool of choice.68 It may be non-democratic but it
is effective. The pockets of non-profit organizations are not deep and resources are extremely
limited; thus a motion to strike can serve to quell dissent and prevent the voices of marginalized
groups from being heard before the courts on a full evidentiary record.
Disturbed by the governments’ move to strike down litigation without a full hearing,
several groups applied to intervene on the motion including disability rights groups, low income
tenants, and Amnesty International.69 In March 2013, the motions for leave to intervene were
heard over two days at the Superior Court of Justice.70
On several occasions the judge asserted that the case was “political” and not “legal”, that
these were “social” problems. After commenting that he would prefer more “academic” and “less
partisan” intervenors–the inference being that if you are poor you are somehow partisan, an
inference which corporations, for instance, seem to escape entirely–the judge permitted the
following coalitions and one academic organization to intervene: i) Amnesty International/the
International Network for Social and Cultural Rights; ii) the Charter Committee on Poverty
64
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Issues/Pivot Legal Society/the Income Security Advocacy Centre/Justice for Girls; and iii) the
David Asper Centre for Constitutional Rights.71
The motion to strike was heard over three days in May 2013. Without the benefit of
evidence, the judge mused about the nature and root causes of homelessness and inadequate
housing and whether the government could be held responsible for either. He worried about the
costs that might be incurred. Of course, had the judge been able to review the evidentiary record,
he would have had access to evidence that it costs half the amount to house people than it does to
keep them homeless.72 Justice Lederer wrote,
[b]y its nature, such an application would require consideration of how our society
distributes and redistributes wealth. General questions that reference, among many
other issues, assistance to those in poverty, the levels of housing supports and income
supplements, the basis on which people may be evicted from where they live and the
treatment of those with psycho-social and intellectual disabilities are important, but
the courtroom is not the place for their review.73
The court’s decision is rooted in an inappropriate and unrealistic baseline for considering
whether marginalized groups have been made worse off by government choices: current
inadequate state action versus a hypothetical state in which the government provides no services
whatsoever. Yet in a modern welfare state, government regulation infuses so many spheres of
social interaction and governments wield so much power over access to resources that not only
direct action but also inertia or inaction must be called to account.74
The Ontario Superior Court of Justice ultimately allowed the governments’ motions,
striking the Right to Housing claim in its entirety. The Court found that the section 7 claim had
no reasonable chance of success because there can be no positive obligations under the
Charter.75 The Court found that the section 15 claim had no reasonable chance of success again
because there could be no positive obligations under the Charter but also because the
governments’ actions did not cause homelessness, homelessness was not an analogous ground,
and the claims on distinct and intersecting grounds would necessarily fail.76 The Court further
held that the claim was political and therefore non-justiciable, and the remedies—particularly
requiring governments to develop a national housing strategy and to require court supervision to
ensure compliance with the orders—were not justiciable.77 The claimants appealed the ruling on
all grounds.78
The issues at stake on the appeal are significant not only for this particular case but
engage issues that are of fundamental importance to the substance and process of Charter
litigation generally. This was reflected in the extraordinary fact that eight interveners and
intervener coalitions, representing sixteen separate well-established public institutions with
71
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provincial, federal and international mandates, were granted leave to intervene on the appeal of
this motion.79 The interveners and intervener coalitions were: (i) David Asper Centre for
Constitutional Rights; (ii) Amnesty International Canada and International Network for
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights; (iii) Women’s Legal Education and Action Fund; (iv)
Charter Committee on Poverty, Pivot Legal Society and Justice for Girls; (v) ARCH Disability
Law Centre, the Dream Team, Canadian HIV/AIDS Legal Network and HIV/AIDS Legal Clinic
Ontario; (vi) Ontario Human Rights Commission; (vii) Colour of Poverty/Colour of Change; and
(viii) Income Security Advocacy Clinic, the ODSP Action Coalition, and the Steering Committee
on Social Assistance.
The appeal was heard over three days in May 2014. In December 2014 the Court issued a
divided ruling.80 The majority of the Court of Appeal, per Pardu JA, dismissed the appeal on the
basis that the application is not justiciable as “there is no sufficient legal component to engage
the decision-making capacity of the courts.”81 The majority held that the claim was essentially a
political claim rather than a rights claim stating “this application is not justiciable. In essence the
application asserts that Canada and Ontario have given insufficient priority to issues of
homelessness and inadequate housing.”82 The majority found that the systemic nature of the
claim rendered it non-justiciable because it failed to follow the “archetypal feature of Charter
challenges” which present a challenge to a single law or single application of a law.83 The
majority mistakenly characterized the claims as asserting “a general freestanding right to
adequate housing”84 and found that there “is no judicially discoverable and manageable standard
for assessing in general whether housing policy is adequate or whether sufficient priority has
been given in general to the needs of the homeless. This is not a question that can be resolved by
application of law, but rather it engages the accountability of legislatures.”85 The majority further
held in one brief paragraph that the remedies sought were non-justiciable because they were
beyond the institutional competence of the courts.86 Having determined that the claim was per se
non-justiciable, the majority held that “it is not necessary to explore the limits, in a justiciable
context of the extent to which positive obligations may be imposed on government to remedy
violations of the Charter, a door left slightly ajar in Gosselin v Quebec … Nor is it necessary to
determine whether homelessness can be an analogous ground of discrimination under s. 15 of the
Charter in some contexts.”87 Finally, the majority upheld the motion judge’s ruling that it was
unreasonable to require that the motions to strike be brought before the record was served.88
In a strong dissent, Feldman JA would have allowed the appeal. She found that the claim
was justiciable under both section 7 and section 15 and that it was “a serious attempt” that “seeks
79
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to have the court address whether government action and inaction that results in homelessness
and inadequate housing is subject to Charter scrutiny and justifies a Charter remedy.” She
wrote,
[i]n my view, it was an error of law to strike this application at the pleadings stage.
The application raises significant issues of public importance. The appellants’
approach to Charter claims is admittedly novel. But given the jurisprudential journey
of the Charter’s development to date, it is neither plain nor obvious that the
appellants’ claims are doomed to fail.89
Feldman JA found that the motion judge had made extensive errors of law in assessing
both the section 7 and section 15 claims, including: (i) erring in his characterization of the
section 7 claim and stating it in an overly broad manner; (ii) erring in stating that the section 7
jurisprudence on whether positive obligations can be imposed on government is settled; (iii)
erring in purporting to define the law in critical areas of jurisprudence on a motion to strike and
drawing conclusions of law in a new way; (iv) determining the very legal issues under both
section 7 and section 15 that are intended to be addressed by an application judge on a full record
and full argument on the merits; and (v) making factual findings that are not in the pleadings, in
the absence of evidence, in order to reach those determinations.90 Beyond this catalogue of
serious errors, Feldman JA held that the “larger error was to strike the claim without allowing a
court to review the evidentiary record assembled by the appellants.”91 Feldman JA ruled that the
claim was justiciable. She found that the justiciability of social and economic rights remains an
open question in the jurisprudence and that courts have in fact adjudicated poverty-related
standards in non-Charter cases.92 She found that the question of whether the Charter imposes
positive obligations on government has also expressly been left open by the Supreme Court.93
She found that the novel element of bringing a systemic claim and seeking systemic remedies
presented no barrier to justiciability. Acknowledging the complexity of the claimants’ systemic
analysis, Feldman JA wrote, “I agree that the broad approach taken in this application is novel
and a number of procedural as well as conceptual difficulties could arise when the court
addresses whether the Charter has been infringed, and if appropriate, determines and applies a
reasonable and workable remedy.” However she concluded that,
the novelty of a claim is not a bar to allowing it to proceed. Although the
development of Charter jurisprudence has to date followed a fairly consistent
procedural path, and has involved challenges to particular laws, we are still in the
early stages of that development. There is no reason to believe that that procedural
approach is fixed in stone. This application asks the court to view Charter claims
through a different procedural lens. That novelty is not a reason to strike it out.94
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Ultimately Feldman JA addressed the high threshold for striking claims on a preliminary
motion and concluded:
This application is simply not the type of ‘hopeless’ claim for which Rule 21 was
intended. It has been brought by counsel on behalf of a large, marginalized,
vulnerable and disadvantaged group who face profound barriers to access to justice.
It raises issues that are basic to their life and well-being. It is supported by a number
of credible intervening institutions with considerable expertise in Charter
jurisprudence and analysis. The appellants put together a significant record to support
their application. That record should be put before the court.95
At the time of writing, the claimants are seeking leave to appeal to the Supreme Court of
Canada.
Regardless of the outcome on the application for leave and any subsequent appeal, the
framing of housing security as protected by fundamental constitutional rights is worth examining
in more detail because the nature of the framing engages fundamental issues of constitutional law
that are relevant to the next evolution in the accessibility and enforceability of these rights.

IV. THE RIGHT TO LIFE, LIBERTY, AND SECURITY OF THE
PERSON: SECTION 7 OF THE CHARTER, HOUSING, AND
HOMELESSNESS
A. OVERVIEW
In the three decades since the Charter’s adoption, increasing numbers of Canadians’ lives have
been shortened and their security lessened by poverty, and the Charter has not provided
remedies. The Right to Housing challenge asserts that the federal and provincial governments
have failed to meet their constitutional responsibilities to protect those aspects of housing that are
fundamental to life and security of the person. The legislative, policy, and program changes they
have implemented exacerbated housing insecurity and directly contributed to increased
homelessness and reduced access to adequate housing. They violate the right to life by reducing
life expectancy of those who are homeless and inadequately housed. They violate security of the
person by causing significant damage to the physical, mental, and emotional health of those who
are homeless and inadequately housed. The governments’ actions and policies that have caused
these deprivations of life and security of the person are not in accordance with the principles of
fundamental justice because they have been arbitrary and have been implemented without regard
to the impact on the homeless and inadequately housed.
The challenge directly engages with three critical issues in section 7 jurisprudence that
are both unsettled in the case law and subject to extensive critical commentary. The claim
probes: (a) the extent to which the rights to life and security of the person protect social and
economic rights that are so fundamental as to be necessities of life; (b) the extent to which
section 7 imposes positive obligations on government to protect socio-economic rights; and (c)
the extent to which a government’s actions/inactions may contravene the Charter.
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The degree to which section 7 protects social and economic rights is unresolved in
Canadian law. However, there are significant statements in the law that anchor the Right to
Housing claim. There is obiter in several Supreme Court of Canada judgments, going back to
1989, that suggests a section 7 claim may successfully challenge governmental failures to
provide necessities of life. Moreover, there is a powerful dissent in the 2002 case of Gosselin that
specifically supports such claims.96 The legal principles in that dissent were not rejected by the
majority. Nonetheless, in the Right to Housing case the Ontario Superior Court of Justice struck
the section 7 claim. The judge seemed to acknowledge that Gosselin left the door open to pursue
such an application if an appropriate evidentiary foundation established “hardship.” However, he
struck the application before any evidence was tendered, relying on two lower court cases97
decided prior to Gosselin whose holdings are inconsistent with Gosselin. He wrote,
[a]s of this moment, there is no positive obligation placed on Canada or Ontario,
arising out of an allegation of a breach of s. 7 of the Charter, having been found to
apply in circumstances such as this. To the contrary, Clark and Masse demonstrate
the opposite. It may be that values, attitudes and perspectives will change, but this
evolution is not sufficient to trigger reconsideration in the lower courts.98
If this proposition is allowed to stand, the question of whether section 7 can protect
necessities of life will never be resolved by the Supreme Court. This proposition creates a
conundrum: the Supreme Court of Canada requires an appropriate evidentiary foundation to
determine the scope of section 7, but the lower court does not allow evidence to be introduced on
a motion to strike.

B. THE LEADING CASE: GOSSELIN V QUÉBEC (ATTORNEY GENERAL)
The section 7 claim in the Right to Housing turns largely on the proper interpretation of both the
majority and dissenting reasons in Gosselin. That case addresses both the scope of section 7
protection for necessities of life and government’s positive obligation to protect those rights. The
Right to Housing application asserts that both the majority and dissenting reasons support the
conclusion that, if there is a proper evidentiary record, a court can find under section 7 that
governments have a positive obligation to protect necessities of life, including aspects of
housing, and that actions or inaction which undermine life and security of the person in this
context violate the Charter.
Since 1989, the Supreme Court of Canada has acknowledged the possibility that section 7
may guarantee positive rights to the necessities of human life, including shelter:
Lower courts have found that the rubric of “economic rights” embraces a broad
spectrum of interests, ranging from such rights, included in various international
covenants, as rights to social security, equal pay for equal work, adequate food,
clothing and shelter, to traditional property–contract rights. To exclude all of these at
this early moment in the history of Charter interpretation seems to us to be
96
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precipitous. We do not, at this moment, choose to pronounce upon whether those
economic rights fundamental to human life or survival are to be treated as though
they are of the same ilk as corporate-commercial economic rights.99
The possibility that section 7 could protect “economic rights fundamental to human life
or survival” was reaffirmed by the majority in Gosselin.100 This possibility remains open today.
Gosselin addressed whether reduced social assistance benefits for youth violated the Charter. In
rejecting the claim concerning “positive rights” to adequate income security, the majority in
Gosselin did not hold that the application was deficient in law but merely that it was deficient in
evidence:
The question therefore is not whether s. 7 has ever been—or will ever be—
recognized as creating positive rights. Rather, the question is whether the present
circumstances warrant a novel application of s. 7 as the basis for a positive state
obligation to guarantee adequate living standards.
I conclude that they do not. With due respect for the views of my colleague Arbour J,
I do not believe that there is sufficient evidence in this case to support the proposed
interpretation of s. 7. I leave open the possibility that a positive obligation to sustain
life, liberty, or security of the person may be made out in special circumstances.
However, this is not such a case. The impugned program contained compensatory
“workfare” provisions and the evidence of actual hardship is wanting. The frail
platform provided by the facts of this case cannot support the weight of a positive
state obligation of citizen support.101 [emphasis added]
Justice Arbour’s dissent in Gosselin, joined in by Justice L’Heureux-Dubé and referred to
with respect by the majority, held:
I would allow this appeal on the basis of the appellant’s s. 7 Charter claim. In doing
so, I conclude that the s. 7 rights to “life, liberty and security of the person” include a
positive dimension. …
This Court has never ruled, nor does the language of the Charter itself require, that
we must reject any positive claim against the state—as in this case—for the most
basic positive protection of life and security. This Court has consistently chosen
instead to leave open the possibility of finding certain positive rights to the basic
means of subsistence within s.7. In my view, far from resisting this conclusion, the
language and structure of the Charter—and of s. 7 in particular— actually compel it.
… .102 [emphasis in original]
The majority decision in Gosselin differs from the dissents of Arbour J and L’HeureuxDubé J primarily with respect to whether there was sufficient evidence of hardship to support the
section 7 claim. The majority reasons do not at any point suggest—explicitly or implicitly—that
99
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any of the legal propositions in the judgments of Justice Arbour or Justice L'Heureux-Dubé are
incorrect.103
Several cases have since held that section 7 does not protect “mere economic rights.” But
as Justice Arbour concluded in Gosselin, “the rights at issue in this case are so connected to the
sorts of interests that fall under s. 7 that it is a gross mischaracterization to attach to them the
label of ‘economic rights’.”104
The Right to Housing claim similarly asserts that it is “a gross mischaracterization” to
label a right to live and sleep in a reasonably safe environment a mere “economic right”. Access
to adequate housing is not a mere “property right”; thus any purported choice by the framers of
the Charter to exclude “property rights” from section 7 is irrelevant to the claim. It requires a
deeper analysis of the meaning of the rights to life and security of the person.
On the second question of “state action,” Arbour J held section 7 can impose positive
obligations on government to act to protect socio-economic rights:
In my view, the results are unequivocal: every suitable approach to Charter
interpretation, including textual analysis, purposive analysis, and contextual analysis,
mandates the conclusion that the s. 7 rights of life, liberty and security of the person
include a positive dimension.105
Arbour J held that on the evidence in Gosselin, section 7 was violated.
Given that the majority in Gosselin does not disavow any of Arbour J’s section 7
analysis, that leading decision leaves open the extent to which section 7 protects the necessities
of life, the extent to which governments may have positive obligations under section 7, and
whether state action is required to trigger a section 7 deprivation. Such fundamental questions
must be decided on the basis of a sufficient evidentiary record. The housing application is novel
in focusing squarely on a necessity of life—housing—rather than on means (such as adequate
social assistance) of obtaining a necessity of life. With 10,000 pages of evidence waiting to be
heard, the Right to Housing challenge provides an opportunity to squarely determine these key
legal questions and should not be peremptorily dismissed on a motion to strike.
Recognizing aspects of adequate housing as protected under section 7 would not
represent a “massive” change in the meaning of section 7, nor would it represent a substantial
imposition on elected governments. The British Columbia Court of Appeal recently recognized
that section 7 grounds a right to at least minimal shelter from the elements.106 The Court held that
a bylaw preventing homeless people from erecting temporary shelters to protect themselves
during the night violated section 7 and was not justified under section 1:
[T]he homeless represent some of the most vulnerable and marginalized members of
our society, and the allegation of the respondents in this case, namely that the Bylaws
impair their ability to provide themselves with shelter that affords adequate
protection from the elements, in circumstances where there is no practicable shelter
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alternative, invokes one of the most basic and fundamental human rights guaranteed
by our Constitution—the right to life, liberty and security of the person.107
Moreover, the Right to Housing application does not request that the court order either
government to implement any particular measures that would provide housing or would entail
the expenditure of any monies. The most extensive remedy sought is merely an order that the
governments begin addressing the problem of homelessness by adopting strategies to reduce and
eliminate homelessness and inadequate housing. It is difficult to imagine a more incremental
advance towards remedying such a serious Charter violation.

C. DEPRIVATION OF RIGHTS TO LIFE AND SECURITY OF THE
PERSON
On a motion to strike, the facts alleged in the pleadings are deemed to be proven. These facts
include: housing is a necessity of life; homelessness and inadequate housing cause reduced life
expectancy and cause significant damage to physical, mental, and emotional health; and
homelessness and inadequate housing can cause death. The application also alleged that “Canada
and Ontario have instituted changes to legislation, policies, programs and services which have
resulted in homelessness and inadequate housing. … As a result, they have created and sustained
conditions which lead to, support and sustain homelessness and inadequate housing.”108
The 16 volumes of evidence tendered in support of the application can be found on the
Advocacy Centre for Tenants Ontario website. This evidence is much more compelling than any
summary in a Notice of Application could be. For example, Dr. Stephen Hwang, one of the
world’s leading experts on the connection between homelessness and health, describes some of
the research that he and others have done and deposes that there is now “good evidence to
support a scientific finding that homelessness causes harm to health and increases the risk of
death.” 109
Dr. Hwang’s evidence shows that the probability that a 25-year-old man living in
shelters, rooming houses, or hotels would survive to age 75 is only half that of the general
population (32 per cent compared to 64 per cent. Amongst women, the study found that 60 per
cent would survive to 75, compared with 79 per cent in the entire cohort. Compared with the
entire population, life expectancy was shorter by thirteen years for men and eight years for
women living in shelters; eleven and nine years, respectively, for those living in rooming houses;
and eight and five years, respectively, for those living in hotels. Thus Dr. Hwang provides
irrefutable evidence that homelessness cause a substantial reduction in life expectancy.110 He
also finds that the same can be said for those who are vulnerably housed.111
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Professor Paula Goering, a very well respected researcher on homelessness and mental
health, deposes that homelessness exacerbates mental health issues and addictions.112 Each of the
four individual applicants’ affidavits describes their own suffering from homelessness or
inadequate housing.

D. CANADA’S AND ONTARIO’S ACTIONS AND FAILURES TO ACT
The Right to Housing application impugns both actions and failures to act by Canada and
Ontario. When a government institutes changes, it is taking positive action. It is well settled that
repealing a statute in whole or in part is government action that is properly subject to section 7
scrutiny.113 Similarly, a Minister’s failure to issue a discretionary permit is an action that can be
challenged under section 7.114 There is substantial support in the jurisprudence for the
proposition that government failures to act can breach Charter rights.115
Ultimately, the Supreme Court has concluded that the distinction between legislative
action and inaction is “very problematic” and provides “no legal basis” for determining whether
the Charter applies.116 As noted in the unanimous judgment in Vriend,
[t]he relevant subsection, s. 32(1)(b), states that the Charter applies to “the
legislature and government of each province in respect of all matters within the
authority of the legislature of each province.” There is nothing in that wording to
suggest that a positive act encroaching on rights is required; rather the subsection
speaks only of matters within the authority of the legislature. Dianne Pothier has
correctly observed that s. 32 is “worded broadly enough to cover positive obligations
on a legislature such that the Charter will be engaged even if the legislature refuses
to exercise its authority” … The application of the Charter is not restricted to
situations where the government actively encroaches on rights.117 [emphasis in the
original]
A full factual record is required to understand the relationships between the various
governmental actions and failures to act.

E. VIOLATIONS ARE CONTRARY TO THE PRINCIPLES OF
FUNDAMENTAL JUSTICE
An infringement of a section 7 right will offend “principles of fundamental justice” if it violates
“basic tenets of our legal system.” These tenets “may be reflected in the common-law and
112
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statutory environment which exists outside of the Charter, they may be reflected in the specific
and enumerated provisions of the Charter, or they may be more expansive than either of
these.”118 They include principles recognized both in domestic law and under international
conventions.119 As stated in Godbout v Longueuil,
... if deprivations of the rights to life, liberty and security of the person are to survive
Charter scrutiny, they must be “fundamentally just” not only in terms of the process
by which they are carried out but also in terms of the ends they seek to achieve, as
measured against basic tenets of both our judicial system and our legal system more
generally.120
The Right to Housing application asserts that the governments’ actions and failures to act
that caused the deprivations of life and security of the person were arbitrary, disproportionate to
any governmental interest, and contrary to international human right norms. Such deprivations
are clearly not in accordance with the principles of fundamental justice. 121

F. INTERNATIONAL OBLIGATIONS SUPPORT ACCESS TO
ADEQUATE HOUSING
In dissent in the 1987 Alberta Reference, then Chief Justice Dickson stated that, “the Charter
should generally be presumed to provide protection at least as great as that afforded by similar
provisions in international human rights documents which Canada has ratified.”122 The majority
of the Supreme Court has since regularly adopted this statement.123 Moreover, the Supreme
Court has ruled that, “In interpreting the scope of application of the Charter, the courts should
seek to ensure compliance with Canada’s binding obligations under international law where the
express words are capable of supporting such a construction.”124
In Victoria v Adams, the trial judge used international law to inform interpretation of the
Charter’s application to housing rights. On appeal, the British Columbia Court of Appeal found,
[t]here is no issue raised on the appeal with respect to the trial judge’s reference to
international instruments as an aid to interpreting the Charter. Nor could there be.
The use of international instruments to aid in the interpretation of the meaning and
scope of rights under that Charter, and in particular the rights protected under s. 7
and the principles of fundamental justice, is well established in Canadian
jurisprudence.125
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As outlined above, numerous international human rights instruments recognize the right
to housing as a fundamental human right. The evidence on the application addresses the
significance of those rights both for determining the scope of section 7 and for understanding
productive solutions to homelessness. The application includes evidence from Miloon Kothari,
who was the United Nations Special Rapporteur on Adequate Housing from 2000 to 2008. UN
Special Rapporteurs are independent experts who are appointed by and report to the United
Nations Human Rights Council. They are mandated to investigate states’ compliance with
international human rights either within a particular country or in relation to a particular theme,
investigating, monitoring, and recommending solutions to human rights problems. In his
affidavit, Mr. Kothari deposes, “My over-arching recommendation is for Canada to adopt a
comprehensive and coordinated national housing strategy based on the recognition of the right to
adequate housing, the indivisibility of human rights and the protection of the most vulnerable.
Canada is one of the few countries in the world without a national housing strategy.”

G. CONCLUSION WITH RESPECT TO SECTION 7
Given its pre-eminence within the overall scheme of the Charter, “the need to safeguard a degree
of flexibility in the interpretation and evolution of s. 7” is, as Justice LeBel suggests in Blencoe,
crucial.126 Also, as Justice L’Heureux-Dubé asserts in G(J), it is necessary to interpret section 7
through an equality rights lens “to recognize the importance of ensuring that our interpretation of
the Constitution responds to the realities and needs of all members of society.”127 This is
especially important if poor people are to benefit equally from the section 7 guarantee.
As many cases illustrate, the poor have fared poorly in attempts to use the Charter. As
the Right to Housing claim identifies, people with disabilities, aboriginal people, racialized
communities, seniors, and youth are all disproportionately affected by homelessness and
inadequate housing. In this context, “the need to safeguard a degree of flexibility in the
interpretation and evolution of section 7” and the need to ensure that “our interpretation of the
Constitution responds to the realities and needs of all members of society” require that the legal
challenge be allowed to proceed to a hearing on its merits.
Although this is a novel case, there are no clear rulings that make it certain or even likely
to fail. International law supports the section 7 claim, as do Canada’s assertions to the UN. The
leading case, Gosselin, implies that success will turn on whether the evidence makes a
compelling case that the claimants and others have been deprived of necessities of life. That can
only be determined at a hearing based on a full factual record.

V. TAKING SYSTEMIC DISCRIMINATION SERIOUSLY:
SECTION 15, HOUSING, AND HOMELESSNESS
A. OVERVIEW
For three decades, Canada’s equality rights jurisprudence has recognized that most
discrimination arises not as a result of isolated acts motivated by discriminatory intent but
through the operation and persistence of systems and established practices that disproportionately
126
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favour dominant groups while disproportionately marginalizing, disempowering, and
disadvantaging many groups throughout our communities. In her landmark 1984 Royal
Commission Report on Equality in Employment, Justice Rosalie Abella called this “systemic
discrimination.” Examining the policies, procedures, and institutions that shape our daily
interactions, she stressed that in identifying discrimination, “it is important to look at the results
of a system” [emphasis added]. Rather than “stamping out brush fires” on a case-by-case basis, it
is necessary to see “the incendiary potential of the whole forest” and to devise remedies that
respond to discrimination’s systemic roots.128
This understanding of discrimination has been developed somewhat further in the
intervening decades by recognizing that the differential privileges that are enjoyed by groups in
society are not natural and inevitable. Instead, all discrimination is socially constructed. Systemic
discrimination arises when systems, practices and institutions of mainstream society reflect and
reinforce the norms, attributes and privileges of dominant groups.129 As the Supreme Court of
Canada wrote in Eaton v Brant County Board of Education in the context of disability-based
discrimination:
Exclusion from the mainstream of society results from the construction of a society
based solely on “mainstream” attributes to which disabled persons will never be able
to gain access. … [I]t is the failure to make reasonable accommodation, to fine-tune
society so that its structures and assumptions do not result in the relegation and
banishment of disabled persons from participation, which results in discrimination
against them.130
While our equality jurisprudence has long endorsed this understanding of systemic
discrimination, there have been very few legal claims that have directly impugned a
discriminatory system. The Right to Housing challenge does this. It is a deliberately and
consciously systemic challenge. The claim does not examine an individual law or policy in
isolation. To do so would provide only an incomplete and correspondingly inaccurate picture of
the social harm. It would pixelate the human experience of disempowerment in a way that
obscures its true operation and that obscures government accountability for its outcomes. Instead,
the Right to Housing challenge explicitly names the elements of government action that construct
and sustain the discriminatory system. It identifies the ways in which these elements operate
cumulatively as an interconnected system, and it identifies the ways in which they actively and
predictably drive discriminatory effects and outcomes. The systemic nature of the Right to
Housing legal claim is both novel and central to its essence.
The equality claim in the Right to Housing challenge addresses three themes. It examines
the principle of substantive equality; the government’s role in creating a new disempowered
class within society; and the discriminatory impacts that the federal and provincial actions have
on discrete and identifiable marginalized populations.

B. SUBSTANTIVE EQUALITY
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The equality guarantee in section 15 of the Charter must be interpreted in a “purposive and
contextual manner in order to permit the realization of the provision’s strong remedial
purpose.”131 The remedial purposes of section 15 are: (a) “to rectify and prevent discrimination
against particular groups suffering social, political and legal disadvantage in society”; (b) “the
amelioration of the conditions of disadvantaged persons”; and (c) “the promotion of a society in
which all are secure in the knowledge that they are recognized at law as human beings equally
deserving of concern, respect and consideration.”132
The Supreme Court has focused its analysis under section 15 around two inquiries: (1)
Does the law create a distinction based on an enumerated or analogous ground?; and (2) Does the
distinction create a disadvantage by perpetuating prejudice and stereotype?133 However, the
Court has repeatedly emphasized that this framework does not “describe discrete [sic] linear
steps” and that “it would be inappropriate to attempt to confine analysis under s 15(1) of the
Charter to a ‘fixed and limited formula.’”134 Rather, these guidelines “should be understood as
points of reference.”135
Since 2011, the Supreme Court has emphasized that ultimately the legal test under
section 15 is this: “at the end of the day, there is only one question: Does the challenged law
violate the norm of substantive equality in s. 15(1) of the Charter?”136
Substantive equality recognizes that section 15 of the Charter is not operating on a blank
slate. It recognizes that laws operate in a pre-existing legal, political, social, economic, and
historical context that is marked by inequality and that this inequality is socially constructed as
opposed to natural or inevitable. For this reason, section 15 has a strong remedial and
ameliorative purpose.137 Substantive equality is rooted in the recognition that identical treatment
can produce or exacerbate inequality and that, often, differential treatment that takes into account
pre-existing differences relative to dominant groups is necessary to secure the remedial purposes
of section 15.138
For this reason, section 15 imposes a duty on government to ensure that the formulation
of law and policy takes account of potentially differential impacts on different groups in society
to ensure that government action does not exacerbate pre-existing disadvantage:
Even in imposing generally applicable provisions, the government must take into
account differences which in fact exist between individuals and so far as possible
ensure that the provisions adopted will not have a greater impact on certain classes of
persons due to irrelevant personal characteristics than on the public as a whole. In
other words, to promote the objective of the more equal society, s. 15(1) acts as a bar
to the executive enacting provisions without taking into account their possible impact
131
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on already disadvantaged classes of persons.139
To determine if government action or inaction violates the norm of substantive equality,
“the matter must be considered in the full context of the case, including the law’s real impact on
the claimants and members of the group to which they belong.”140 “The focus of the inquiry is on
the actual impact of the impugned law, taking full account of social, political, economic and
historical factors concerning the group” [emphasis added].141
Courts have repeatedly held that where government enters a field it has an obligation to
ensure that it does so in a non-discriminatory way. As the Supreme Court stated in Eldridge, “in
many circumstances, this will require governments to take positive action.” The Court in that
case rejected as a “thin and impoverished vision of section 15(1)” the argument advanced by
governments “that section 15(1) does not oblige governments to implement programs to alleviate
disadvantages that exist independently of state action.”142
As detailed above, the federal and provincial governments have been actively engaged in
the field of adequate and affordable housing for decades. The Right to Housing challenge argues
that the range of actions the federal and provincial governments have undertaken to restructure
governments’ role in housing failed to take into account the needs and circumstances of those
who are homeless and at risk of homelessness. The governments’ actions make those who are
already vulnerable, even more vulnerable. The governments’ actions exacerbate their preexisting disadvantage. The cumulative effect of the changes to the laws and policies has been to
drive more people into homelessness and inadequate housing and to sustain conditions that
perpetuate homelessness, inadequate housing, and the accompanying physical, psychological,
social, and material harms.
This brief example illustrates how government actions are interrelated and have a
cumulative effect: government actions that set social assistance rates significantly below market
rent, at the same time that government also terminates funding for and construction of affordable
housing, eliminates rent regulation, and introduces procedures to expedite evictions, predictably
and inevitably have a differential burden on those who are homeless or at risk of homelessness. It
fails to examine the law’s impact from the perspective of those who are homeless and at risk of
homelessness and so fails to ensure that the law and policy changes are fine-tuned to address and
ameliorate the conditions of disadvantaged groups. As a result the governments’ actions produce
more homelessness and more vulnerability.
As the Supreme Court of Canada has recognized, “[i]f the state conduct widens the gap
between the historically disadvantaged group and the rest of society rather than narrowing it,
then it is discriminatory.”143
Whether this differential burden is substantively discriminatory must be considered in a
full context—on the basis of evidence—taking into consideration factors such as the pre-existing
disadvantage of the claimant group (those who are homeless or at risk of homelessness), the
139

Eldridge v British Columbia, supra note 115 at para 64, citing and adopting this passage from the dissent of
Lamer CJC in Rodriguez v British Columbia (Attorney General), [1993] 3 SCR 519.
140
Withler v Canada, supra note 133 at para 2.
141
Ibid at para 39. See also, Ermineskin Indian Band and Nation v Canada, [2009] 1 SCR 222 at paras 193–94;
Corbiere v Canada (Minister of Indian and Northern Affairs), [1999] 2 SCR 203 at paras 63–64 (per L’HeureuxDubé J, dissenting but not on this point) [Corbiere v Canada]; Law v Canada, supra note 131 at paras 59–61; R v
Turpin, [1989] 1 SCR 1296 at 1331-1332, [Turpin]; Andrews, supra note 132 at 165.
142
Eldridge v British Columbia, supra note 115 at paras 72-73.
143
Quebec v A, supra note 136 at para 332.

https://digitalcommons.osgoode.yorku.ca/jlsp/vol24/iss1/2

39

Heffernan et al.: Fighting for the Right to Housing in Canada

needs, capacities and circumstances of the claimant group, and in particular the nature of the
interest that is affected.144
The Supreme Court of Canada has unanimously ruled that,
[t]he discriminatory calibre of differential treatment cannot be fully appreciated
without evaluating not only the economic but also the constitutional and societal
significance attributed to the interests adversely affected by the legislation in
question. Moreover, it is relevant to consider whether the distinction restricts access
to a fundamental social institution, or affects ‘a basic aspect of full membership in
Canadian society,’ or ‘constitute[s] a complete non-recognition of a particular
group’. 145 [emphasis added]
Canada’s international law commitments are essential to the understanding of the nature
of the interests at stake and the significance of the impact on those interests. Canada’s
international human rights commitments clearly assert that housing is a basic human right. Thus,
the harm that is imposed or exacerbated by the impugned laws, policies, and activities is of
profound constitutional significance.

C. STATE CONSTRUCTION OF A NEW DISEMPOWERED GROUP
From its first section 15 case in Andrews, the Supreme Court of Canada has recognized that the
Charter must be responsive to the multiple inventive and evolving ways in which human beings
discriminate against each other. While the text of the Charter enumerates specific grounds on
which discrimination frequently occurs, the text also expressly identifies that this is not a closed
list. As Justice Wilson wrote in Andrews, the Charter guarantees protection from discrimination
on the basis of the enumerated grounds, but also on the basis of an open-ended list of grounds
which are “analogous”:
I believe also that it is important to note that the range of discrete and insular
minorities [targeted by discrimination] has changed and will continue to change with
changing political and social circumstances. … It can be anticipated that the discrete
and insular minorities of tomorrow will include groups not recognized as such today.
It is consistent with the constitutional status of s. 15 that it be interpreted with
sufficient flexibility to ensure the ‘unremitting protection’ of equality rights in the
years to come.146
The Right to Housing challenge argues that the impugned government actions have a
discriminatory impact on groups protected by section 15, identified by the analogous ground of
homelessness, and by the grounds of sex, disability, race, and reliance on social assistance.
The claim asserts that the impugned changes to the laws and policies have an
unconstitutional effect because they failed to take into account the impact that the changes have
on: (i) those who are homeless and/or at risk of homelessness; and (ii) those who are affected on
the basis of sex, race, disability, and receipt of social assistance, thereby exacerbating their pre144
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existing disadvantages, marginalization, exclusion, and deprivation.
What is also novel is that the legal argument not only demands recognition of
“homelessness” as a protected analogous ground, but it also implicates the governments in
constructing and sustaining a new marginalized group within society—the homeless. Outside of
section 15, courts have acknowledged the marginalization and vulnerability of the homeless.147
But whether homelessness constitutes an analogous ground under section 15 remains an issue of
first impression for the courts.
The touchstones to determine if a ground of distinction is “analogous” are “the purpose of
s. 15(1), the nature and situation of the individual or group at issue, and the social, political, and
legal history of Canadian society’s treatment of the group.” Analogous grounds “serve to
advance the fundamental purpose of s. 15(1)” and are based on “characteristics that we cannot
change or that the government has no legitimate interest in expecting us to change to receive
equal treatment under the law.” They will often encompass those “lacking in political power”,
“vulnerable to having their interests overlooked and their rights to equal concern and respect
violated,” and “vulnerable to becoming a disadvantaged group.”148
The legal claim argues that those who are homeless are among the most marginalized,
disempowered, precariously situated, and vulnerable in Canadian society. They are subject to
widespread discriminatory prejudice and stereotype and have been historically disadvantaged in
Canadian society. Their rights, needs and interests are frequently ignored and overlooked by
government. Those who are at risk of homelessness are “vulnerable to becoming a disadvantaged
group.” All of these are factors that have been recognized as contributing to the identification of
an analogous ground.
The fact that those who are homeless are “heterogeneous” in the sense of encompassing
all races, religions, abilities, sexes, and routes into homeless has no significance. Any group of
people identified by a single ground—whether an enumerated or an analogous ground—will
always be heterogeneous as there is never a single characteristic that is definitive of a group. For
example, women, though protected by the enumerated ground of sex are, at the same time,
utterly heterogeneous in terms of race, ability, sexual orientation, class, religion, and other
characteristics. What is relevant under the section 15 analysis is whether the impugned
government policy affects the group in a way that is meaningfully understood with reference to
the identified enumerated or analogous ground. The Right to Housing challenge argues that
examining the impugned law and policy changes with reference to the ground of homelessness
illuminates impacts that are constitutionally meaningful.
As Marie-Eve Sylvestre has written,
it is clear that homeless people in Canada are subject to widespread prejudice,
stereotype, stigma and discrimination based on their social condition of
homelessness. False stereotypes and prejudices have informed government policy
and programs, both federally and provincially in relation to this group.149
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Moreover, the governments’ response to homelessness has been increasingly marked by a
tendency to criminalize the homeless and regulate their use of public space. These government
responses in turn feed into and fuel stereotypes about and prejudice towards those who are
homeless.150

D. DISCRIMINATION AGAINST DISTINCT MARGINALIZED
POPULATIONS
The third part of the equality rights claim details how the impugned laws and policies have
distinct adverse impacts on groups who are identified by enumerated grounds, that the impacts
are experienced specifically in relation to those grounds, and that the impugned laws and policies
as a result violate section 15 on grounds including sex, disability, race, and receipt of social
assistance.151
For example, the impugned laws and policies have a very specific adverse impact on
women trying to escape domestic violence. As Janet Mosher has written, “Violence against
women in their intimate relationships is one of the most commonly cited pathways into
homelessness (whether visible or hidden) for women and children.”152 Because of a lack of
support for affordable housing, emergency shelter, and transitional housing with supports,
women are forced to choose between homelessness for themselves and their children or returning
to, or remaining in, a violent situation.153 Moreover, single mothers often lose custody of their
children upon becoming homeless, exacerbating the social harms.154
As detailed above, the governments’ actions also have very specific discriminatory
impacts on the basis of disability.155 Existing housing is often inaccessible to persons with
disabilities and new affordable housing that is accessible is not being built. This has an adverse
impact on those with physical disabilities because the failure to take the needs, capacities and
circumstances of this group into account results in individuals and families waiting ten years or
longer for affordable housing that meets their needs. Deinstitutionalization in the absence of
supports for community living has resulted in thousands of persons with psycho-social and
developmental disabilities becoming homeless. UN human rights treaty monitoring bodies have
expressed concern that Canadian governments’ failure to provide adequate supports for
community living has resulted in persons with mental disabilities being forced to live in
detention solely due a lack of supports for living in housing in the community.
The Right to Housing challenge also details that Aboriginal people are overrepresented
among the homeless and inadequately housed population, suffering some of the worst housing
conditions in the country. Newcomers and racialized persons are also disproportionately
affected.
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Overall, the harms arising from the impugned government actions have created a system
that fails to take into account and address those who are homeless and most at risk of
homelessness. As a result, they exacerbate the pre-existing disadvantages of these groups and
entrench the marginalization of those who are most vulnerable.

VI. REMEDIES
Just as the legal claim asserts that the harms perpetuated by the impugned government actions
are systemic, the remedies must equally be systemic. The Right to Housing claim seeks: (a)
declarations that rights under section 7 and section 15 have been violated; (b) an order to
implement national and provincial housing strategies; and (c) a supervisory order in respect of
developing these strategies. Each of these remedies falls entirely within the repertoire of
remedies that courts can and have fashioned under the Charter.
Section 24 of the Charter states that, where Charter rights and freedoms have been
infringed, the court has the authority to order “such remedy as the court considers appropriate
and just in the circumstances.” What is “appropriate and just in the circumstances” can only be
decided after a full hearing, on the basis of evidence, which makes findings about “the
circumstances” which produce the breach and support the efficacy of particular remedies:
Section 24(1) … merely provides that the appellant may obtain such remedy as the
court considers ‘appropriate and just in the circumstances.’ It is difficult to imagine
language which could give the court a wider and less fettered discretion. It is
impossible to reduce this wide discretion to some sort of binding formula for general
application in all cases, and it is not for appellate courts to pre-empt or cut down this
wide discretion.156
Courts must take a purposive approach to Charter remedies that provides “a full,
effective and meaningful remedy for Charter violations,” bearing in mind that “a right, no matter
how expansive in theory, is only as meaningful as the remedy provided for its breach.”157 A
rights violation requires a responsive and effective remedy.158
An appropriate and just remedy “is one that meaningfully vindicates the rights and
freedoms of the claimant,” “take[s] account of the nature of the right that has been violated” and
is “relevant to the experience of the claimant”:
As such, s.24, because of its broad language and the myriad of roles it may play in
cases, should be allowed to evolve to meet the challenges and circumstances of those
cases. That evolution may require novel and creative features when compared to
traditional and historical remedial practice because tradition and history cannot be
barriers to what reasoned and compelling notions of appropriate and just remedies
demand. In short, the judicial approach to remedies must remain flexible and
responsive to the needs of a given case.159
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Remedies ordered under section 24 can address the harm a violation causes both to an
individual and to society because Charter violations impair public confidence and diminish
“public faith in the efficacy of the constitutional protection.”160
Ultimately what the Right to Housing challenge seeks is constructive, coordinated
government action in compliance with the government’s Charter obligations that supports and
sustains the most vulnerable group’s rights to life, security of the person, and equality.

VII. CONCLUSION
Socio-economic rights claims challenge the fundamental tenets of classic liberal constitutional
theory: they require the judiciary to scrutinize, evaluate, and if necessary order changes so that
socio-economically marginalized groups have real access to rights and resources. The problem,
of course, is that these functions have traditionally been seen as the exclusive purview of the
executive and legislative, not the judicial, branches of government.161 As the former Chief
Justice of South Africa, Pius Langa notes, this formal interpretation allows “… judges to avoid
engagement and evade the search for justice.”162
Unfortunately the motion judge and majority of the Ontario Court of Appeal chose to do
exactly that in Tanudjaja, raising a fundamental question as to the nature of access to justice in
Canada and the right of some of the most marginalized communities to have their critical,
unresolved constitutional claims heard on a full evidentiary record.
Systemic rights claims grounded in assertions of social and economic rights are
necessarily complex. That complexity is a reflection of the depth of marginalization and
oppression experienced by the claimants. Extensive evidence is necessary to bring these
experiences and impacts to light. Such claims do the hard work of challenging systemic privilege
and they require that lawyers and judges confront some of the unspoken assumptions of how the
legal system engages with constitutional rights claims. Charter litigation that proceeds on the
basis of challenging a single law in isolation is premised on the notion that the baseline
experience is one of constitutional compliance that delivers security and rights protection. The
unspoken assumption is that an individual starts with an experience of rights protection and the
impugned state action is an aberrant divergence from that presumed status of security. As a
result, the more a claimant has a lived experience of rights protection and security—the closer an
individual sits to the centre of privilege—the easier it is to see a rights violation as an
unconstitutional aberration. By contrast, the more bricks there are in the state edifice that
supports and sustains discrimination and marginalization, the more immune it is to challenge. If
one challenges a single statute in isolation, even if successful, the edifice does not fall; it simply
readjusts. Pursuing real rights protection then requires that a detailed evidentiary record reveal
160
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and map the components and consequences of an integrated system. This is not an unreasonable
or impossible task.
Canadian courts do not always evade the search for justice when there is a collision
between the judicial, executive and legislative branches of government. In Vriend the Supreme
Court stated,
… we must remember that the concept of democracy is broader than the notion of
majority rule, fundamental as that may be … Democratic values and principles under
the Charter demand that legislators and the executive take these into account; and if
they fail to do so, courts should stand ready to intervene to protect these democratic
values as appropriate.163
Mobilization of public support is often necessary for struggles to gain recognition from
the courts. They must be “… fought for, described as rights, and linked to a more refined and
legally developed argument about the positive obligations of the state.”164
The 10,000 pages of evidence which have not yet been allowed before the courts include
two affiants who found themselves both homeless and battling mental illness. One of them is
Linda Chamberlain. She lived on and off the streets for close to 35 years. She speaks with a
compelling voice about the importance of holding the state accountable for ensuring adequate
housing is truly a right for all and about what the right to housing really means:
When I got my apartment at Mainstay Housing, it felt like I was awake for the first
time in my life. I was 47 years old. I had a clean home, my own space, and a feeling
of safety after thirty years of living in shelters, on the street, or in rooming houses. At
first I thought it was a mistake; that I wasn’t good enough; that it was too good to be
true. I didn’t unpack for the first year I lived there because I was so afraid that I
wouldn’t be able to stay.165
We hope that the Right to Housing challenge will provide all those who live in Canada
with the security and community that Linda Chamberlain finally found.
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